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American Exceptionalism in Constitutional
Amendment
Richard Albert-
The American traditions of constitutional amendment
raise contrasts and continuities with constitutional amend-
ment in much of the rest of the democratic world. On one
hand, the United States Constitution stands apart from many
foreign democratic constitutions: it is extraordinarily diffi-
cult to amend, it does not entrench any current form of for-
mal unamendability, and it has resisted the global trend to-
ward the doctrine of unconstitutional constitutional
amendment. On the other, state constitutions in the United
States more closely resemble the world's democratic consti-
tutions: they are freely susceptible to formal amendment,
they entrench current forms of formal unamendability, and
they recognize the doctrine of unconstitutional constitution-
al amendment. Constitutional amendment in the United
States is therefore peculiar in entrenching both departures
from and convergences with constitutional amendment in
the larger democratic world. In this article prepared for a
symposium on "State Constitutional Change," I explore how
American state constitutions differ from the United States
Constitution, yet resemble the world's other democratic con-
stitutions in how they structure constitutional amendment. I
conclude with thoughts on the organizing logic of constitu-
tional amendment under the United States Constitution.
* Associate Professor and Dean's Research Scholar, Boston College Law School; Visit-
ing Associate Professor of Law and Canadian Bicentennial Visiting Associate Professor
of Political Science, Yale University (2015-16). E-mail: richard.albert@bc.edu. I am
grateful for the helpful comments I received in the course of presenting an earlier
draft of this article at the Symposium on "State Constitutional Change" hosted by the
Arkansas Law Review at the University of Arkansas School of Law in Fayetteville on
January 22, 2016. 1 also thank Vik Amar, John Dinan, Lawrence Friedman, Jim Gard-
ner, David Landau, Jon Marshfield, and Bob Williams for helpful discussions on the
ideas developed in this article. I am also grateful to the editorial team at the Arkansas
Law Review for preparing this article for print: Cristen Handley, Maria Korzendorfer,
and Ross Simpson were immensely helpful.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Constitution is unique among the
master-text democratic constitutions of the world. Long
since James Madison saluted the Philadelphia Convention for
having "reared the fabrics of governments which have no
model on the face of the globe,"' we have often been remind-
ed that there is something different, indeed special, about
the United States Constitution. Political philosopher Alexis
de Tocqueville observed in the nineteenth century that it is
"the most perfect federal constitution that ever existed." 2
Historian George Billias calls American constitutionalism
"this country's greatest gift to human freedom." 3 Constitu-
tional scholars Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg, and James
Melton highlight the United States Constitution as a rare "ex-
ample of constitutional superlongevity." 4 And the late Jus-
tice Antonin Scalia rejected the use of foreign law to inter-
pret the United States Constitution, precisely because in his
view, the Constitution is rooted in distinctly American val-
ues.5
There is much about the United States Constitution that
distinguishes it from others. At a high level of abstraction,
few could disagree that the United States Constitution, or
any other democratic constitution for that matter, is unique.
Many if not most democratic constitutions differ from each
other-if not superficially with respect to their text, then in-
trinsically with respect to their foundations-insofar as
democratic constitutions generally spring from the indige-
nous experiences of the people who agree to be bound by
their terms. This expressivist theory of constitutions, as
Mark Tushnet describes it, reminds us that "constitutions
emerge out of each nation's distinctive history and express
its distinctive character." 6 On this view, a democratic consti-
tution proclaims a national identity and reflects the socio-
1. THE FEDERALIST No. 14, at 89 Uames Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
2. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 166 (1963).
3. GEORGE ATHAN BILLIAS, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM HEARD ROUND THE WORLD,
1776-1989: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE xi (2009).
4. ZACHARY ELKINS ET AL., THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS 162 (2009).
5. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 624, 628 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
6. Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE
L.J. 1225, 1270 (1999).
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legal values that shape the order the constitution governs.7
In the United States, the Constitution's values are rooted in
the promise of self-government that opens the doors to the
preamble: "We, the People of the United States." 8 The au-
thors of the Constitution entrenched this declaration of pop-
ular sovereignty to distinguish the new republic from the
British model of parliamentary sovereignty.9
Even at a lower level of abstraction, the United States
Constitution stands apart from others, both as a matter of
constitutional law and constitutional history. Taking an his-
torical perspective, Stephen Gardbaum has situated the
United States Constitution at the vanguard of the world's
constitutions for being written, supreme, entrenched against
ordinary legislative amendment or repeal, enforced by
courts exercising the power of judicial review, and supple-
mented by a bill of rights. 10 From the perspective of consti-
tutional law, Steven Calabresi reminds us of the distinctly
American legal rules and doctrines authorized by the United
States Constitution, namely capital punishment, the nones-
tablishment norm, the exclusionary rule, and heightened
constitutional protections for free speech." To declare to-
day that the Constitution of the United States is different
from other democratic constitutions is therefore both cor-
rect and yet perhaps also unoriginal. The forms and features
of America's constitutional exceptionalism have been chron-
icled many times before, and one could not be faulted for be-
lieving there is nothing left to say.12
7. Sujit Choudhry, Globalization in Search ofjustification: Toward a Theory of
Comparative Constitutional Interpretation, 74 IND. L.J. 819, 830 (1999). On the process,
concept, and implications of identity formation, see GARY JEFFREY JACOBSOHN,
CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY (2010).
8. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
9. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at
382 (1969).
10. Stephen Gardbaum, The Myth and the Reality ofAmerican Constitutional Ex-
ceptionalism, 107 MICH. L. REV. 391, 393 (2008).
11. Steven G. Calabresi, "A Shining City on a Hill": American Exceptionalism and
the Supreme Court's Practice of Relying on Foreign Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1335, 1405-07,
1410 (2006).
12. See, e.g., SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: A DOUBLE-EDGED
SWORD 17, 23-24 (1997); Lorraine E. Weinrib, The Postwar Paradigm and American
Exceptionalism, in THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS 84, 85-86 (Sujit Choudhry
ed., 2006); David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Declining Influence of the United States
2016] 219
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Yet the story of America's constitutional exceptionalism
nonetheless remains incomplete. We cannot fully appreciate
the uniqueness of the United States Constitution without
highlighting the differences in how constitutional amend-
ment is structured in the United States and other constitu-
tional democracies. There are three major markers of dif-
ference. First, the United States Constitution is
extraordinarily difficult to formally amend, in contrast to
most other less-rigid democratic constitutions. Second, un-
like many democratic constitutions, the United States Consti-
tution entrenches no current form of formal unamendability.
Third, the doctrine of unconstitutional constitutional
amendment has migrated across the democratic world, but
has yet to reach the Constitution, and indeed has long been
rejected by the United States Supreme Court. Each of these
points of distinction is important in its own right, but collec-
tively they suggest foundational differences between the
United States and much of the rest of the democratic world.
What complicates and clarifies the nature of America's
exceptionalism in constitutional amendment is that the the-
ory and doctrine of constitutional amendment under the
United States Constitution differs also from the experience of
American state constitutions. Amending state constitutions
is much easier than the United States Constitution; some
state constitutions entrench current forms of formal una-
mendability, and some state courts recognize the doctrine of
unconstitutional constitutional amendment. On each of the-
se fronts, the tradition of American state constitutions re-
flects continuities with the larger democratic world and fur-
ther sharpens the uniqueness of the United States
Constitution in constitutional amendment.
In this Article prepared for a Symposium on "State Con-
stitutional Change," I show that American state constitutions
often differ from the United States Constitution and in some
ways more closely resemble the world's other democratic
constitutions in how they structure constitutional amend-
ment. In Part II, I demonstrate that the United States Consti-
tution is more difficult to amend than both foreign demo-
Constitution, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 762, 779-809 (2012); Miguel Schor,judicial Review and
American Constitutional Exceptionalism, 46 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 535, 536-38 (2008).
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cratic constitutions and American state constitutions. In
Part Ill, I explain that the United States Constitution en-
trenches no current form of formal unamendability, unlike
many foreign democratic constitutions and some American
state constitutions. In Part IV, I show that the doctrine of
unconstitutional constitutional amendment does not apply
under the United States Constitution but it does under some
foreign democratic constitutions and American state consti-
tutions. In Part V, I conclude with thoughts on the organiz-
ing logic of constitutional amendment under the United
States Constitution.
11. THE DIFFICULTY OF FORMAL AMENDMENT
Master-text democratic constitutions span the range of
amendability. Some, like the German Basic Law, are de-
signed to be amendable, and indeed are: the text has been
amended dozens of times in accordance with the rules au-
thorizing political actors to formally amend the document.13
Others are designed to be amendable both in theory and re-
ality, but over time, the text becomes virtually unamendable
for all but low-stakes matters of provincial, parliamentary,
or regional interest, as in the case of Canada.1 4 Still other
master-text constitutions entrench formal amendment rules
authorizing political actors to formally amend the constitu-
tion for all subjects large and small, but those rules ultimate-
ly become inoperable as a result of a divided political climate
that prevents the formation of the consensus required to
amend the text. The United States Constitution falls in this
third category of amendability: today, it is amendable in
theory alone.' 5
13. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIc LAW], May 8, 1948, pt VII, art. 79 (Ger.), translation
at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch-gg/englisch-gg.html#p0012 [https://
perma.cc/8DN7-WUNB].
14. CONSTITUTION OF CANADA, pt V.
15. U.S. CONST. art V ("The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both Houses shall
deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Applica-
tion of the Legislatures of two-thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for
proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purpos-
es, as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three-fourths of
the several States, or by Conventions in three-fourths thereof, as the one or the other
Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress: Provided that no Amendment
which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in
any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article;
2016] 221
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A. Constitutional Rigidity
Constitutional amendment in the United States is ex-
traordinarily difficult. There are four general formal
amendment procedures in total: two variations on each of
two major amendment tracks. For the first pair, the Consti-
tution requires Congress to agree by a two-thirds superma-
jority to propose an amendment for consideration by the
states, three-quarters of which must then ratify the proposal
in state legislatures or state conventions, as Congress in-
structs, in order for the amendment to become law.1 6 The
second pair alternatively authorizes a two-thirds superma-
jority of states to petition Congress to call a constitutional
convention where the assembled body will propose amend-
ments that must be ratified, if they are to become law, by
three-quarters of state legislatures or state conventions,
again as Congress chooses.' 7 Only the first of these two
amendment tracks has ever been successfully used in Amer-
ican history.' 8
It is hard to measure with any reliability the relative ri-
gidity of codified constitutions.' 9 For all of their weakness-
es, 20 studies of amendment difficulty nonetheless reinforce
the impression that the United States Constitution is one of
the most difficult democratic constitutions to amend, if not
the most difficult. 21 In her empirical study of thirty-nine
constitutional democracies, Astrid Lorenz calculates that the
four most rigid constitutions belong to Belgium (9.5), the
and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the
Senate.").
16. U.S. CONST. art. V.
17. U.S. CONST. art V.
18. See William B. Fisch, Constitutional Referendum in the United States ofAmeri-
ca, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 485, 490 (2006).
19. See Tom Ginsburg & James Melton, Does the Constitutional Amendment Rule
Matter at All?: Amendment Cultures and the Challenges of Measuring Amendment Diffi-
culty, 13 INT'L J. CONST. L. 686, 687 (2015).
20. For a survey of weaknesses in existing empirical studies of comparative
constitutional amendment, see Richard Albert, The Structure of Constitutional
Amendment Rules, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 913, 918-28 (2014).
21. Richard Albert, The Difficulty of Constitutional Amendment in Canada, 53
ALBERTA L. REV. 85, 86 (2015). Elsewhere, I have argued that the Canadian Constitu-
tion may be even harder to formally amend than the United States Constitution, at
least with respect to matters implicating mega-constitutional politics. Id at 86-87.
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United States and Bolivia (9.0), and the Netherlands (8.5).22
On her scale, the least rigid constitutions belong to the Unit-
ed Kingdom (1.0) and New Zealand (1.0), perhaps unsurpris-
ing given that neither has a master-text constitution that
formally differentiates between constitutional and ordinary
law. 23 In another study of amendment difficulty, Arend Li-
jphart compares amendment thresholds across thirty-six
constitutional democracies on the basis of the majorities re-
quired to amend the constitution.24 He ultimately ranks the
United States at the top of the scale of amendment difficulty,
among seven other constitutional democracies: Argentina,
Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan, Korea, and Switzerland. 25
Consistent with these two indices, the most influential
study of amendment difficulty ranks the United States at the
top of all other democratic constitutions in its study sam-
ple.2 6 Drawing from the amendment experience of thirty-six
countries, Donald Lutz analyzes the structure of amendment
procedures in order to enumerate the entire universe of offi-
cial actions that could conceivably constitute a formal
amendment rule.2 7 He then assigns a quantum of difficulty
to each action-a total of sixty-eight possible component
parts in an amendment process, for example according to
who may initiate, propose, or ratify an amendment.28 Lutz
subsequently arrives at an index of amendment difficulty by
aggregating the scores assigned to each discrete action.29
The result is not surprising: the United States Constitution
(5.10) ranks first among all democratic constitutions in its
study sample, followed by Switzerland (4.75) and Venezuela
(4.75), then Australia (4.65), Costa Rica (4.10), Spain (3.60)
and Italy (3.40).30 In contrast, Lutz concludes that New Zea-
land (0.50) has the easiest "constitution" to amend.31
22. Astrid Lorenz, How to Measure Constitutional Rigidity: Four Concepts and
Two Alternatives, 17 J. THEORETICAL POL. 339, 358-59 (2005).
23. Id.
24. AREND LIJPHART, PATTERNS OF DEMOCRACY: GOVERNMENT FORMS AND
PERFORMANCE IN THIRTY-SIX COUNTRIES 208 tbl.12.1 (2d ed. 2012).
25. Id.
26. DONALD S. LUTZ, PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 170 (2006).
27. Id. at 166-70.
28. Id. at 166-68.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 170.
31. LUTZ, supra note 26.
2016]1 223
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Notwithstanding the difficulty inherent in measuring
comparative amendment difficulty, these empirical studies
suggest how hard it is to formally amend the United States
Constitution. But the lived experience of the Constitution
proves just as much. Political actors have ratified only twen-
ty-seven formal amendments since the Constitution was
adopted in 1789, an extraordinarily low number given that
there have been well over eleven thousand amendment pro-
posals in the same period. 32 The ratio of proposals to ratifi-
cations has only increased over the years, highlighting an
important trend at the moment: the decelerating frequency
of formal amendment under Article V. The last formal
amendment was ratified nearly twenty-five years ago in
1992,33 and next-most recent was ratified twenty years prior
in 1971.34 There were four amendments in the preceding
forty-year period,35 six in the preceding seventy years,36 and
fifteen in the first eighty years of the Constitution.37 This de-
celerating pace of formal amendment is paired with a mod-
ern fact of constitutional law in the United States: constitu-
tional change today occurs "off the books." 38 What results is
an informal amendment, where the authoritative meaning of
the Constitution is transformed without a corresponding al-
teration to its text.3 9 The infrequent recourse to Article V
has led one scholar to argue that formal amendment is now
32. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Constitutional Constancy: Why Congress Should Cure
Itself of Amendment Fever, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 691, 692 (1996). In comparison to the
United States Constitution, states have historically had a high rate of amendment suc-
cess; by the end of 1979, sixty-two percent of all amendments proposed to U.S. state
constitutions had been approved (4704 approved of the 7563 proposed). See Albert
L. Sturm, The Development ofAmerican State Constitutions, 12 PUBLIUS 57, 74 (1982).
33. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXVII (stating that "no law, varying the compensation
for the services of the Senators and Representatives, shall take effect, until an election
of Representatives shall have intervened").
34. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI (stating that "the right of citizens of the United
States, who are eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or by any State on account of age").
35. See U.S. CONST. amends. XXII, XXIII, XXIV, XXV.
36. See U.S. CONST. amends. XVI, XVII, XVIII, XIX, XX, XXI.
37. See U.S. CONsT. amends. I, II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X, XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV.
38. Stephen M. Griffin, The Nominee is... Article V, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 171, 172
(1995).
39. Heather K. Gerken, The Hydraulics of Constitutional Reform: A Skeptical Re-
sponse to Our Undemocratic Constitution, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 925, 929 (2007).
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irrelevant,40 a position that I do not share but that nonethe-
less reflects an influential view of the declining importance
of Article V.41
But Article V is not necessarily fated to a future of dis-
use. True, the threshold requirements that make formal
amendment difficult are unlikely to change. But the present
degree of political division may well evolve over time to be-
come less divided; the opposite occurred from the Progres-
sive Era to the present day. In the 1910s, constitutional
amendment via Article V was thought too easy: four consti-
tutional amendments were adopted in rapid succession over
a short span of ten years,42 causing political actors and ob-
servers to wonder whether the rules of constitutional
amendment should be made harder so as to make amend-
ment less frequent.43 The point is simply that the present
difficulty of formal amendment is not a predictor of formal
amendment difficulty in the future. But today it is undenia-
ble that the United States Constitution is hard to amend,
perhaps as hard if not harder to amend than most other
democratic constitutions.
B. Constitutional Flexibility
Other democratic constitutions are today more fre-
quently formally amended. Lutz's comparative study is in-
structive on this front because it determines the amendment
rate-the average number of formal amendments passed
per year since the coming-into-force of a given constitu-
tion-for each country in his study sample.44 He assigns the
lowest amendment rate to the United States (0.13), well be-
low the average score (2.54) and the high score (13.42).45
40. See David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114
HARV. L. REV. 1457,1459-60 (2001).
41. See Richard Albert, The Expressive Function of Constitutional Amendment
Rules, 59 McGILL L.J. 225, 228 (2013).
42. Richard Albert, The Progressive Era of Constitutional Amendment, in
EFICItNCIA E tTICA NA ADMINISTRA.AO POIBLICA 197, 205 (Luiz Alberto Blanchet et al.
eds., 2015).
43. Richard Albert, Constitutional Disuse or Desuetude: The Case ofArticle V, 94
B.U. L. REV. 1029,1079 (2014).
44. LUTZ, supra note 26, at 154.
45. Id. at 170. Lutz assigns an amendment rate of 0.00 to the Japanese Constitu-
tion because it has not been amended since its adoption. Id. For reasons explained in
large part or in whole by political culture, constitutional change in Japan occurs
2016] 225
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But Lutz's study ends as early as 1940 (for Argentina) and as
late as 1992 (for most countries under study), 46 meaning
that he does not account for changes that have occurred in
the past twenty-five years. These dated data do not neces-
sarily undermine Lutz's findings, but they do invite the im-
portant question whether amendment frequency may have
changed over the past generation.
We can update Lutz's comparative study with external
sources to identify how many times democratic constitu-
tions have been amended. In Canada, for example, there
have been eleven formal amendments since the adoption of
the Constitution Act, 1982 through 2015, for an amendment
rate of 0.33.47 In the Czech Republic, there were six formal
amendments from the adoption of the Constitution in 1992
to 2010, for the same amendment rate of 0.33.48 In France,
the twenty-four formal amendments from the founding of
the Fifth Republic in 1958 to 2010 yields an amendment rate
of 0.46.49 The fifty-eight formal amendments in Germany
from the creation of the Basic Law in 1949 to 2010 generates
an amendment rate of 0.95.50 The Indian amendment rate is
even higher: 1.58, measuring from the coming-into-force of
the Constitution in 1950 through 2010.51 Other amendment
rates include: Italy (0.23, fourteen amendments from 1948
to 2010);52 South Africa (1.23, sixteen amendments from
1996 to 2009);53 and Switzerland (1.50, fifteen amendments
through the interpretation and re-interpretation of the Constitution by the Cabinet
Legislation Bureau. See Richard Albert, Amending Constitutional Amendment Rules, 13
INT'L J. CONST. L. 655,671 (2015).
46. LUTZ, supra note 26.
47. See Albert, supra note 21, at 88.
48. See Maxim Tomoszek, The Czech Republic, in How CONSTITUTIONS CHANGE: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY 41, 41 (Dawn Oliver & Carlo Fusaro eds., 2011).
49. See Sophie Boyron, France, in How CONSTITUTIONS CHANGE: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY, supra note 48, at 115, 132.
50. See lens Woelk, Germany, in How CONSTITUTIONS CHANGE: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY, supra note 48, at 143, 145.
51. See Mahendra Pal Singh, India, in How CONSTITUTIONS CHANGE: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY, supra note 48, at 169, 169, 174.
52. Carlo Fusaro, Italy, in How CONSTITUTIONS CHANGE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY, Su-
pra note 48, at 211, 218.
53. Hugh Corder, The Republic of South Africa, in How CONSTITUTIONS CHANGE: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 48, at 261, 274.
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from 2000 to 2010).54 We can also update the amendment
rate of the United States Constitution through 2015 (0.12).
Some of the few exceptions to the rule that the United States
Constitution has one of the lowest amendment rates, or the
lowest, appear to be the Spanish Constitution, which has
been subject to only one formal constitutional amendment
from its adoption in 1978 to 2010,ss and the Constitutions of
Japan (1946), Denmark (1953), Nauru (1968), St. Vincent
(1979), and Antigua (1983), which have not yet once been
formally amended since their adoption. 56
Table I: Formal Amendment in
National Democratic Constitutions57




Canada 1982 11(to2011) 033
Czech
Republic U
France 1958 24 046
Germany 15
India 1950 95 1.58
Italy I1)4 14 0 23
South Africa 1996 16 (to 2009) 1.23
Spain 197H 1 0.03
Switzerland 2000 15 1.50
54. Giovanni Biaggini, Switzerland, in How CONSTITUTIONS CHANGE: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 48, at 303, 314.
55. See Ascensi6n Elvira, Spain, in How CONSTITUTIONS CHANGE: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY, supra note 48, at 281, 281-82.
56. Kenneth Mori McElwain & Christian G. Winkler, What's Unique about the
Japanese Constitution?: A Comparative and Historical Analysis, 41 J. JAPAN STUD. 249,
249 n.1 (2015).
57. The content of this table is drawn from the sources cited in notes 33, 48-56.
All data are current through 2010, unless otherwise indicated.
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This pattern appears to hold for state constitutions in
the United States. Lutz's study reviews constitutional
amendment rates for each of the states, which have a mean
amendment rate of 1.23, measuring from the year of the
coming-into-force of the constitution through 1991.58 The
high state constitutional amendment rate belongs to Ala-
bama (8.07, 726 amendments since 1901).59 For our com-
parative purpose of evaluating the rigidity of the United
States Constitution, the best comparators, however, are the
state constitutions that have been in force since before or
shortly after the coming-into-force of the United States Con-
stitution in 1789. These state constitutions developed
alongside the United States Constitution, over much the
same period of time. Each has a higher amendment rate
than the United States Constitution: Indiana (0.29, forty-
seven amendments since 1851); Iowa (0.34, fifty-four since
1857); Maine (0.89, 172 since 1820); Massachusetts (0.51,
120 since 1780); Minnesota (0.77, 120 since 1858); New
Hampshire (0.63, 145 since 1784); Ohio (1.05, 173 since
1851); Vermont (0.24, fifty-four since 1793); and Wisconsin
(0.87, 146 since 1848).60
58. LuTz, supra note 26, at 158-59.
59. Id. at 158.
60. THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOV'Ts, 47 THE BOOK OF THE STATES 11 (2015).
228
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Table II: Formal Amendment in the United States 61
Constitution # of Amendment
Year Amendments Rate
United States I 0 1-
Indiana 1851 47 0.29
Iowa 1 571 0 1
Maine 1820 172 089
Massachusetts I10
Minnesota 1858 120 077
New
Hampshire
Ohio 1851 173 1.05
Vermont I'( 5I ( 11
Wisconsin 1848 146 0.87
Another more recent source of verification for the unu-
sual difficulty of formal amendment in the United States is an
important study by Mila Versteeg and Emily Zackin. 62 Draw-
ing from a number of data sets, Versteeg and Zackin calcu-
lated an "average annual revision rate," which represents the
total number of years during which a country or U.S. state
experienced some form of constitutional change, whether
resulting in replacement or amendment, divided by the
lifespan of the jurisdiction in years.63 They arrived at an av-
erage annual revision rate across all states of 0.35, a little
higher than the rate across all foreign national constitutions
of 0.21.64 By comparison, the average annual revision rate
for the United States is 0.07, placing it among the ten lowest
rates worldwide, though we should note that this ranking in-
cludes non-democratic constitutions where the text and the
61. See id. The data are current as of January 1, 2015.
62. See generally Mila Versteeg & Emily Zackin, American Constitutional Excep-
tionalism Revisited, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1641 (2014) (demonstrating that state constitu-
tions share similarities with foreign constitutions).
63. Id. at 1674.
64. Id.
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rules they entrench may not matter much.65 Among demo-
cratic constitutions alone, the United States ranks in the
three lowest average annual revision rates, behind Denmark
and Japan.66
There are important reasons for the relative flexibility
of state constitutions-reasons that reflect a unique under-
standing of state constitutionalism that differs from the the-
ory of U.S. constitutionalism. 67 As Alan Tarr has explained,
"one of the most striking features of state constitutional poli-
tics is the tendency to pursue constitutional change through
formal mechanisms of constitutional change, through
amendment or replacement of the constitution, rather than
through litigation."68 State constitutions are more likely to
track the political culture of the governing coalition, which
may lead to more frequent constitutional changes. 69 State
constitutions are more detailed, since they must deal with
the day-to-day governmental functions of health, safety, wel-
fare, and morals; they are also more comprehensive than the
national constitution because the states retain all residual
powers not delegated to the national government.70 This
helps to at least partly explain the higher amendment rates
for state constitutions because the longer a constitution the
higher its amendment rate.71 More broadly, John Dinan's
historical analysis of the development and evolution of pro-
cesses of formal constitutional change in American states
has revealed two points of note: first, state constitutional
designers wanted to create flexible constitutions to allow po-
litical actors to respond to needs that would inevitably arise
65. Id. at 1675, 1675 n.153.
66. Id. at 1675 n.153.
67. See John Dinan, "The Earth Belongs Always to the Living Generation": The De-
velopment of State Constitutional Amendment and Revision Procedures, 62 REV. POL.
645 (2000).
68. G. Alan Tarr, State Constitutional Politics: An Historical Perspective, in
CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN THE STATES: CONTEMPORARY CONTROVERSIES AND HISTORICAL
PATTERNS 3, 3 (G. Alan Tarr ed., 1996).
69. See Daniel J. Elazar, The Principles and Traditions Underlying State Constitu-
tions, 12 PUBLIUS 11, 17-18 (1982).
70. Id. at 16-17.
71. See Donald S. Lutz, Patterns in the Amending of American State Constitutions,
in CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN THE STATES: CONTEMPORARY CONTROVERSIES AND
HISTORICAL PATTERNS, supra note 68, at 24, 35. Note that state constitutions have over
time become "long legislative codes," in contrast to the national Constitution. STEPHEN
M. GRIFFIN, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: FROM THEORY TO POLITICS 36 (1996).
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over time; and second, state constitutional designers be-
lieved the very process of constitutional change would pro-
duce salutary benefits for active, informed, participatory,
and peaceful citizenship. 72
Ill. FORMAL UNAMENDABILITY
Today, democratic codified constitutions commonly es-
tablish at least two categories of provisions: the first are al-
terable by the formal amendment rules in the text, and the
second are resistant to them. Formal unamendability is a
second marker of distinction in constitutional amendment
between the United States Constitution and much of the rest
of the democratic world. Whereas many other democratic
constitutions-including some American state constitu-
tions-absolutely entrench constitutional provisions against
amendment, the United States Constitution today entrenches
no current form of formal unamendability.
In this Article, I use the phrase formal unamendability
to refer to two distinguishable though related constitutional
designs. First-order formal unamendability refers to the ab-
solute entrenchment of a principle, rule, value, structure,
symbol or institution against amendment,73 meaning that
the constitutional text states directly that the thing identified
as unamendable is immune to the rules of formal amend-
ment. Second-order formal unamendability refers to the
text's identification of at least two different modalities of
constitutional change, one reserved for amendment and the
other reserved for revision, the latter requiring more far-
reaching popular participation than the former, for instance
a constituent assembly or a constitutional convention that
has the power to propose the adoption of an altogether new
constitution. A revision accordingly requires political actors
or the people, or both, to meet a higher threshold of direct or
mediated popular participation than they are otherwise re-
quired to meet for an amendment, the theory being that
transformational change may not be achieved with the pro-
72. See JOHN J. DINAN, THE AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION 63 (2006).
73. For a study of the structure of unamendable provisions, see Yaniv Roznai,
Unamendability and the Genetic Code of the Constitution, 27 EUR. REV. PUB. L. 775
(2015).
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cedures used for amendment. In this second constitutional
design, formal unamendability refers to provisions that are
alterable, only not by ordinary amendment. Today, and in-
deed since 1808, the United States Constitution entrenches
no binding first-order or second-order form of formal una-
mendability.74
A. The Unlimited Amendment Power
As David Dow has written, "Article V speaks simply."75
It tells us there are no current barriers to formal amendment
in the United States except procedural ones. Article V im-
poses process-based limits on how to propose and ratify a
formal amendment, and it rejects any content-based re-
strictions on what is subject to the rules of formal amend-
ment.76 Whereas many of the constitutions in the democrat-
ic world do impose restrictions on what may be amended,77
the United States Constitution entrenches no such re-
strictions on what may be amended and instead establishes
limitations only on how to amend the text of the Constitu-
tion.
But this has not always been true. The authors of the
United States Constitution decided during the drafting peri-
od to defer the slave trade to future consideration by making
it temporarily unamendable until the year 1808.78 The Con-
stitution was created to be formally amendable, "[p]rovided
that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year
One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner
affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the
first Article."79 The first clause authorized states to permit
the moving and importation of slaves, and the second guar-
anteed that taxation would be census-based.80 Both of these
temporarily unamendable provisions formed part of the
74. See infra Sections IlIl.A-B.
75. David R. Dow, When Words Mean What We Believe They Say: The Case ofAr-
ticle V, 76 IOWA L. REV. 1, 29 (1990).
76. U.S. CONST. art. V.
77. See infra Section Ill.B.
78. Douglas Linder, What in the Constitution Cannot be Amended?, 23 ARIZ. L.
REV. 717, 721 (1981).
79. U.S. CONST. art V.
80. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cs. 1, 4.
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Constitution's infrastructure of slavery.81 These are said to
have been necessary conditions for the slave-holding states
to agree to the constitutional bargain, at least for the first
generation of the Constitution, since the political actors pre-
sent at the founding had planned for their successors to re-
visit the subject twenty years later "with less difficulty and
greater coolness." 8 2 This temporarily unamendable provi-
sion is no longer a constraint on political actors, but it does
hold historical importance.
All other provisions in the United States Constitution
are freely amendable, at least in theory. True, the present
difficulty of formally amending the Constitution undermines
the claim that it is "freely amendable" in anything but the
most theoretical sense of the phrase,83 whatever the text
might allow as a matter of formal law. What best reflects
this reality is the Equal Suffrage Clause, a provision that I
have elsewhere described as "constructively unamenda-
ble." 8 4 The Equal Suffrage Clause prevents any change to a
state's equal representation in the U.S. Senate without that
state's consent.85 To quote from Article V, "no State, without
its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the
Senate."86 Scholars have read this provision as entrenching
first-order formal unamendability.8 7 But its plain reading
81. See Jamal Greene, Originalism's Race Problem, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 517, 518-
19 (2011).
82. Linder, supra note 78.
83. See Sanford Levinson, The Political Implications of Amending Clauses, 13
CONST. COMMENT. 107, 107-110 (1996).
84. See Albert, supra note 43, at 1043.
85. U.S. CONST. art. V.
86. U.S. CONST. art. V.
87. See, e.g., J. M. Balkin, The Constitution as a Box of Chocolates, 12 CONST.
COMMENT. 147,149 (1995); Raoul Berger, New Theories of "Interpretation": The Activist
Flight from the Constitution, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 6 (1986); Douglas H. Bryant, Unorthodox
and Paradox: Revisiting the Ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, 53 ALA. L. REV.
555, 562 (2002); Paul D. Moreno, "So Long as Our System Shall Exist": Myth, History,
and the New Federalism, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 711, 720 (2005); Eric A. Posner &
Adrian Vermuele, Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111 YALE L.J. 1665, 1681
(2002); Stephen J. Schnably, Emerging International Law Constraints on Constitutional
Structure and Revision: A Preliminary Appraisal, 62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 417, 477 (2008);
Paul M. Schwartz, Constitutional Change and Constitutional Legitimation: The Example
of German Unification, 31 Hous. L. REV. 1027, 1068 (1994); Michael Stern, Reopening
the Constitutional Road to Reform: Toward a Safeguarded Article V Convention, 78
TENN. L. REV. 765, 774 (2011); Louise Weinberg, Dred Scott and the Crisis of 1860, 82
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 97, 119 (2007).
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does not formally foreclose the possibility of unequal state
voting power in the Senate. It says only that the state to be
deprived of its equal voting power in the Senate must con-
sent to the change. Nevertheless, because no state is likely
to consent to its differential representation-unless it were
to be disproportionately higher than others, in which case
the states with disproportionately lower representation
would withhold their own consent-we can predict with
some assurance that this provision is unlikely to be used.
The constructive unamendability of a provision like the
Equal Suffrage Clause arises out of the evolution of constitu-
tional politics from a climate that might as a formal matter
allow a provision to be amended into a climate that makes it
unlikely, though never impossible because the text continues
to authorize it, to achieve the requisite supermajorities to
formally amend that provision.88 Constructive unamendabil-
ity therefore contrasts with formal unamendability insofar
as it is not an explicit choice of constitutional design to make
a constitutional provision formally unamendable. A further
difference between formal and constructive unamendability
is that a formally unamendable clause is forever unamenda-
ble but what may be constructively unamendable today may
not remain constructively unamendable tomorrow. 89
Taking a broader view, we can perceive that the basic
architecture of Article V reflects three principles that help
political actors evaluate the validity of a constitutional
amendment: self-referentialism, procedural strictness, and
finality. As to the first, Article V offers political actors no in-
structions or guidance beyond what appears in its text. Arti-
cle V details the sufficient conditions for formal amendment.
Second, Article V specifies only procedural rules, onerous
88. Richard Albert, Constructive Unamendability in Canada and the United States,
67 SUP. CT. L. REV. 181, 182 (2014).
89. Of course, no constitutional provision is forever unamendable; a formally
unamendable provision cannot withstand revolution, for instance. JEFFREY
GOLDSWORTHY, PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY: CONTEMPORARY DEBATES 70 (2010). Nor
can formal unamendability foreclose a contrary judicial interpretation, as shown by
the Honduran Supreme Court's recent decision to disapply a formally unamendable
provision in the Honduran Constitution. See Leiv Marsteintredet, The Honduran Su-
preme Court Renders Inapplicable Unamendable Constitutional Provisions, INT'L J.




rules to be sure but only procedural ones, to propose and
ratify a formal amendment. Third, in addition to specifying
how to propose an amendment to the Constitution, Article V
also tells us how we are to identify when the Constitution has
been amended. The amendment process becomes final
when the requisite majorities have duly proposed and rati-
fied an amendment; there is no intervening step of assessing
the constitutionality of a proposal nor does Article V demand
a third-party examination of the constitutional correctness
of adopting a particular amendment.90
No matter which of the four amendment methods is de-
ployed, the proposal phase requires two-thirds support and
the ratification phase demands three-quarters support.91
We must therefore appreciate both the simplicity and defini-
tiveness of the enabling clause of the text: when the two-
thirds and three-quarters majorities collaborate to approve
and ratify an amendment proposal, that proposal becomes
"[v]alid to all Intents and Purposes, as part of this Constitu-
tion." 9 2 That legislative or popular majorities have acted un-
der extraordinary circumstances to reach agreement on a
given constitutional amendment is sufficient, under Article
V, to inscribe the amendment into the constitutional text.
Self-referentialism, procedural strictness, and finality-
these are the foundational principles in the architecture of
Article V.
B. Limitations on the Amendment Power
Today, it has become more likely than not that a new
constitution will entrench a formally unamendable provi-
sion. From 1789 to 1944, no more than seventeen percent of
all new constitutions entrenched formal amendability; this
percentage rose to twenty-seven percent from 1945 to 1988,
and since 1989, over fifty percent of all new constitutions
entrench a formally unamendable provision.93 This appears
90. U.S. CONST. art. V.
91. U.S. CONST. art. V.
92. U.S. CONST. art. V.
93. See Yaniv Roznai, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments: A Study of the
Nature and Limits of Constitutional Amendment Powers (Feb. 2014) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, London School of Economics and Political Science),
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to be a growing trend in constitutional design, though
whether it remains prevalent in new constitutions remains
yet to be seen in the next wave of constitution-making. For
now, however, formal unamendability is more common than
ever before, perhaps the best known example being the pro-
tection for human dignity in the German Basic Law. The
clause reads that "[h]uman dignity shall be inviolable," 94 and
this clause is itself entrenched against amendment.95
In an earlier study, I suggested that there are three
kinds of first-order formal unamendability: preservative,
transformation- al, and reconciliatory. 96 Preservative una-
mendability disables the formal amendment rule as to provi-
sions that are thought to reflect the self-identity and founda-
tional values of the state.97  For example, the Turkish
Constitution makes secularism an unamendable feature of
the state.98 Transformative unamendability is an effort to
repudiate the past and to embrace a new beginning, often
aspirational.9 9 For instance, the recent Constitution of Bos-
nia and Herzegovina entrenches all civil and political rights
against amendment.1 00 Reconciliatory unamendability, for
its part, seeks to achieve peace between warring parties by
granting unamendable rights of amnesty or immunity from
criminal or civil prosecution for wrongdoing prior to the
drafting or amendment of a new constitution.' 0 The now-
superseded Constitution of Niger entrenched a formally
unamendable grant of amnesty for those involved in coups




94. See GRUNDGESETZ, supra note 13, tit. 1, art. 1 (1).
95. GRUNDGESETZ, supra note 13, tit. Vll, art. 79 (3).
96. See Richard Albert, Constitutional Handcuffs, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 663, 678-98
(2010).
97. Id. at 678.
98. TORKIYE CUMHURIYETI ANAYASAS1 [TCA] [CONSTITUTION], pt. I, art 2 (Turk.).
99. Albert, supra note 96, at 685.
100. Id.; ANEKS 4 OPtEG OKVIRNOG ZA MIR U BOSNI I HERCEGOVINI KOJI JEZIK
[CONSTITUTION], art. X, § 2 (Bosn. & Herz.).
101. Albert, supra note 96, at 693.
102. CONSTITUTION DE LA CINQUIEME REPUBLIQUE DU NIGER [CONSTITUTION], tit. XII,
arts. 136, 141 (1999) (Niger).
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I subsequently suggested two additional categories of
first-order formal unamendability: bargain-formation and
value-expression.10 3 Constitutional designers may choose to
entrench a constitutional provision against formal amend-
ment in order to secure either a temporary or permanent
bargain and to move on to less contentious matters, as in the
case of the Slave Trade Clauses.104 Constitutional designers
may also entrench a formally unamendable constitutional
provision in order to express-and perhaps also to shape-
constitutional values. Whatever its efficacy as a matter of
law and politics, a formally unamendable rule conveys a
message of its importance, either to the constitution's de-
signers or to its subjects, or both. The French Constitution,
for instance, makes republicanism formally unamendable.105
The clause originally appeared in the 1884 French Constitu-
tion as a repudiation of monarchy and an embrace of the re-
publican model of government.1 06 These two additional cat-
egories of the purposes of formal unamendability bring our
total to five, though the boundaries separating them from
each other are not airtight. They are not mutually exclusive,
nor can we claim that they are always clearly distinguisha-
ble. Nonetheless, each of the five illustrates a different kind
of function that first-order formal unamendability can play.
Democratic constitutions sometimes also entrench
forms of second-order formal unamendability. This kind of
unamendability is not direct; we perceive it by implication of
a constitutional design that establishes at least two different
tiers of procedures for formal constitutional change: formal
amendment rules and formal revision rules. Formal
amendment rules authorize political actors to alter the con-
stitutional text in a way that preserves legal continuity be-
tween the period pre-change and post-change. As Carl
Schmitt explained, a textual alteration may be called an
amendment "only under the presupposition that the identity
103. Richard Albert, The Unamendable Core of the United States Constitution, in
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 13, 16 (Andrbs
Koltay ed., 2015).
104. See supra text accompanying notes 78-82.
105. 1958 CONST. art. 89 (Fr.).
106. See Nathalie Droin, Retour sur la loi constitutionnelle de 1884: contribution
d une histoire de la limitation du pouvoir constituent ddriv4, 80 REVUE FRAN AISE DE
DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL 725, 740 (2009).
2016] 237
ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:217
and continuity of the constitution as an entirety is pre-
served."1 07 Moreover, where the amendment does not "of-
fend the spirit or the principles" of the constitution under
change and "preserve[s] the constitution itself," the altera-
tion is properly understood as an amendment. 0 8
In contrast, a formal revision entails a more intensely
expressed commitment to the change and deeper conse-
quences for the state, although it is also a kind of textual
change. The most important distinction between amend-
ment and revision is that revision breaks continuity in the
legal order by departing from the fundamental presupposi-
tions of the constitution.1 09 For example, we might label the
change a revision, not an amendment, if the right to free ex-
pression entrenched in a democratic constitution were abol-
ished or retrenched in a material way.11 0 Some democratic
constitutions make an explicit distinction between the con-
cepts of amendment and revision, thereby requiring political
actors or the people to satisfy different procedures for each
of these two kinds of changes.'1 ' Formal revision generally
requires more participatory or more democratic procedures
to affect the desired change, which is usually a change of
high moment. It makes sense for big or bigger-than-usual
forms of formal amendment to satisfy more onerous proce-
dures for their legal and sociological validation, and indeed
perhaps their moral validation too. The United States Con-
stitution does not make this distinction, either by its text or
its interpretation.
Yet this distinction between amendment and revision is
common in the American state tradition. It is a conceptually
blurry distinction since it is not always clear what separates
amendment from revision.11 2 Still, nearly half of U.S. state
107. CARL SCHMITT, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 150 (effrey Seitzer trans., ed.,
2008).
108. Id. at 150, 153.
109. See Thomas M. Cooley, The Power to Amend the Federal Constitution, 2
MICH. L.J. 109, 118 (1893).
110. see JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 238-39 (2005).
111. See, e.g., BUNDES-VERFASSUNGSGESETZ [B-VG] [CONSTITUTION], ch. II, art. 44
(Austria); CONSTITUCION ESPANOLA [CE] [CONSTITUTION], pt X, arts. 166-68 (Spain);
CONSTITUTION FtDtRALE [CST] [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 18, 1999, tit. VI, ch. 1, arts. 192-95
(Switzerland).
112. See Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, 88 AM.
POL. Sc. REV. 355, 356 (1994).
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constitutions refer to "revision."113 In the American state
tradition, amendment and revision are generally understood
to be alternative means of constitutional change," 4 the for-
mer authorizing piecemeal change, for instance to one provi-
sion or a set of related provisions, and the latter authorizing
comprehensive alterations to more than one provision or
subjects, or indeed the adoption of a new text altogether.115
As Walter Dodd wrote in the definitive early history of state
constitutional change, the creation of multiple procedures
for altering the constitutional text may be traced to the need
to have one mechanism for changes to single provisions and
another for changes to the entire constitution. 11 6 The varia-
ble degree of difficulty evident in national constitutions be-
tween amendment and revision maps similarly onto state
constitutions, where amendment procedures are not only
generally different,117 but also usually easier to satisfy than
revision procedures.118
In the course of constitutional interpretation, state su-
preme courts have elaborated the distinction between
amendment and revision.' 19 The Supreme Court of Califor-
nia, for example, defined the parameters of amendment and
revision, both mentioned in the California Constitution.1 20
An amendment, the court explained, is "such an addition or
change within the lines of the original instrument as will ef-
fect an improvement, or better carry out the purpose for
which it was framed."121 A revision, on the other hand, is a
113. Gerald Benjamin, Constitutional Amendment and Revision, in 3 STATE
CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 177, 178 (G. Alan Tarr & Robert F. Wil-
liams eds., 2006).
114. G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 38 (2000).
115. See Michael G. Colantuono, The Revision of American State Constitutions:
Legislative Power, Popular Sovereignty, and Constitutional Change, 75 CALIF. L. REV.
1473, 1478 (1987).
116. WALTER FAIRLEIGH DODD, THE REVISION AND AMENDMENT OF STATE
CONSTITUTIONS 118 (1910).
117. See Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Law Processes, 24 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 169, 226 (1983).
118. Bruce E. Cain & Roger G. Noll, Malleable Constitutions: Reflections on State
Constitutional Reform, 87 TEx. L. REV. 1517, 1524 (2009).
119. See, e.g., Bess v. Ulmer, 985 P.2d 979, 982 (Alaska 1999); Adams v. Gunter,
Jr., 238 So. 2d 824, 829-30 (Fla. 1970); In re Opinion to the Governor, 178 A. 433, 439
(R.I. 1935).
120. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, §§ 1-4.
121. Livermore v. Waite, 36 P. 424, 426 (Cal. 1894).
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"far reaching change in the nature and operation of our gov-
ernmental structure"1 22 or that "substantially alter[s] the
basic governmental framework set forth in our Constitu-
tion." 1 2 3 Second-order formal amendability is therefore pre-
sent in the United States, but only at the level of state consti-
tutions.1 24
Like other democratic constitutions and unlike the
United States Constitution, some state constitutions also en-
trench forms of first-order formal unamendability.1 25 For
122. Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 583
P.2d 1281, 1286 (Cal. 1978).
123. Legislature v. Eu, 816 P.2d 1309, 1319 (Cal. 1991).
124. In many state constitutions that recognize the distinction between
amendment and revision, the power of amendment is located in the legislature and
the power of revision belongs to constitutional conventions. Compare KAN. CONST. art.
XIV, § 1 (authorizing a legislature-centric amendment process), with KAN. CONST. art.
XIV, § 2 (authorizing a convention-centric revision process); MINN. CONST. art. IX, § 1
(authorizing a legislature-centric amendment process), with MINN. CONST. art. IX, §2
(authorizing a convention-centric revision process); NEV. CONST. art. XVI, § 1 (author-
izing a legislature-centric amendment process), with NEV. CONST., art. XVI, § 2 (author-
izing a convention-centric revision process); N.M. CONST. art. XIX, § 1 (authorizing a
legislature-centric amendment process), with N.M. CONST. art. XIX, § 2 (authorizing a
convention-centric revision process); Wis. CONST. art. XII, § 1 (authorizing a legisla-
ture-centric amendment process), with Wis. CONST. art. XII, § 2 (authorizing a conven-
tion-centric revision process). Insofar as the United States Constitution does not for-
mally distinguish between amendment and revision yet, it does authorize both a
legislative and conventional route to formal constitutional change; it is possible that
the design of Article V was intended to reflect the same separation of functions that
we see in state constitutions, namely that the power of amendment belongs to legisla-
tures and the power of revision to a constitutional convention. I am currently devel-
oping this point in a paper-in-progress. See Richard Albert, Constitutionalizing the
Constituent Power (on file with author).
125. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. I, § 22 ("The right to trial by jury shall be secure to
all and remain inviolate."); KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 11 ("The liberty of the press
shall be inviolate....); N.C. CONST. art. 1, §6 ("The legislative, executive and supreme
judicial powers of the State government shall be forever separate and distinct from
each other."); N.M. CONST. art. II, § 5 ("The rights, privileges and immunities, civil, po-
litical and religious guaranteed to the people of New Mexico by the Treaty of Guada-
lupe Hidalgo shall be preserved inviolate."). I am grateful to John Dinan for raising the
question whether entrenching the "inviolability" of a right signals its unamendability.
This demands further thought and inquiry, though I note that the language of inviola-
bility reflects what we see in constitutions today that make rights unamendable by
prohibiting their "diminishment." See, e.g., CONSTITUTION DE LA RPUBLIQUE ALG9RIENNE
DtMOCRATIQUE ET POPULAIRE [CONSTITUTION], tit. IV, art. 178 (AIg.); CONSTITUlfAO
FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION], sec. VIII, sub-sec. II, art. 60, § 4(V) (Braz.);
CONSTITUTION DE LA RtPUBLIQUE DtMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO [CONSTITUTION], tit. XVIII, art.
185 (Dem. Rep. Congo); CONSTITUTIA REPUBLICII MOLDOVA [CONSTITUTION], tit. VI, art.
142(2) (Mold.); GRONDWET VAN NAMIBI2 [CONSTITUTION], ch. 19, art. 131 (Namib.);
KOHCTHTyIpiH YKpaiHH [CONSTITUTION], tit. XIII, art. 157 (Ukr.).
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example, the Alabama Constitution states that "representa-
tion in the legislature shall be based upon population, and
such basis of representation shall not be changed by consti-
tutional amendments" 126 and that "to guard against any en-
croachments on the rights herein retained, we declare that
everything in this Declaration of Rights is excepted out of the
general powers of government, and shall forever remain in-
violate."1 27 The latter provision appears in substantially the
same language in the Arkansas Constitution,1 28 which also
declares that "the equality of all persons before the law is
recognized, and shall ever remain inviolate."1 29 The Consti-
tution also uses the same language to protect the liberty of
the press 30 and the right to a jury trial.131 This tracks the
unamendable provisions entrenched in early state constitu-
tions,1 32 including The Fundamental Constitutions of Caroli-
126. ALA. CONST. art. XVIII, § 284. As I have written elsewhere, formal una-
mendability may not be effective in constraining the conduct of political actors nor
may courts interpret formally unamendable clauses in a way that reflects the nature
of the outright textual prohibition, but formal unamendability does nonetheless exer-
cise an expressive function. See Richard Albert, Nonconstitutional Amendments, 22
CAN. J.L. & JURIs. 5, 32-40 (2009). The Alabama Constitution's prohibition on amend-
ments to the basis of representation in the legislature has been interpreted precisely
in this way: the Supreme Court of Alabama has read the formally unamendable clause
on legislative representation as an ineffective constraint on the will of the people but
as nevertheless expressing the fundamental constitutional value of representative
government. See Opinion of the Justices, 81 So. 2d 881 (Ala. 1955).
127. ALA. CONST. art. I, § 36.
128. ARK. CONST. art. II, § 29.
129. ARK. CONST. art. II, § 3.
130. ARK. CONST. art. II, § 6.
131. ARK. CONST. art. II, § 7.
132. The Delaware Constitution made unamendable a number of rights, legisla-
tive rules, and the religious non-establishment norm, among others. See DEL. CONST.
art. XXX ("No article of the declaration of rights and fundamental rules of this State,
agreed to by this convention, nor the first, second, fifth, (except that part thereof that
relates to the right of sufferage) twenty-sixth, and twenty-ninth articles of this consti-
tution, ought ever to be violated on any presence whatever."). The Georgia Constitu-
tion designated as formally unamendable a rule on the expiration of legislative terms
as well as the freedom of the press and the right to a jury trial. GA. CONST. art III ("It
shall be an unalterable rule that the house of assembly shall expire and be at an end,
yearly and every year, on the day preceding the day of election mentioned in the fore-
going rule."); GA. CONST. art. LXI ("Freedom of the press and trial by jury to remain in-
violate forever."). The freedom of the press was similarly formally unamendable in
Maryland and South Carolina. MD. CONST. art. XXXVIII ("That the liberty of the press
ought to be inviolably preserved."); S.C. CONST. art. XLIII ("That the liberty of the press
be inviolably preserved."). New York made the right to a jury trial formally unamend-
able. N.Y. CONST. art. XLI.
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nas, providing that "[t]hese fundamental constitutions, in
number a hundred and twenty, every part thereof, shall be
and remain the sacred and unalterable form and rule of gov-
ernment of Carolina forever."133 In both of these current and
obsolete cases of first-order unamendability, however, the
entrenching provision remains vulnerable to formal change
since it is not itself entrenched against formal amendment.
This design defect raises the possibility of double amend-
ment,134 another point of similarity in first-order formal
unamendability between American states and much of the
rest of the democratic world, though it is a structural flaw.135
IV. UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENT
The third marker of distinction between the United
States Constitution and much of the rest of the world. It may
seem strange to contemplate the possibility of an unconsti-
tutional constitutional amendment but the phenomenon is
far from irregular, having taken root in some form or anoth-
er in almost every major part of the world. 136 The doctrine
of unconstitutional constitutional amendment exists today
even in the United States. But only state constitutional
amendments have ever been declared unconstitutional. No
Article V amendment has been successfully challenged under
the United States Constitution, further evidence of the Con-
stitution's uniqueness when it comes to constitutional
amendment.
133. John Locke, The Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina, in THE FEDERAL AND
STATE CONSTITUTIONS: COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES,
TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES, Now OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
2743, 2786 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1906).
134. Double amendment appears to be a disfavored technique. See Virgilio
Afonso da Silva, A Fossilised Constitution?, 17 RATIO JURis 454, 458-59 (2004). Akhil
Amar acknowledges that double amendment would "have satisfied the literal text of
Article V," but he observes that it is a "sly scheme." AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S
CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 293 (2005).
135. See Albert, supra note 45, at 662-64.
136. Yaniv Roznai, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments-The Migration
and Success ofa Constitutional Idea, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 657, 670-710 (2013).
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A. Judicial Deference to Formal Amendment
Whether on procedural or substantive grounds, the Su-
preme Court has rejected all claims that a duly passed con-
stitutional amendment can be unconstitutional under the
United States Constitution. The Court has in all cases de-
ferred, either to the people and their representatives be-
cause they have successfully passed the strictures of Article
V, or to Congress because as a political institution it is better
positioned to resolve questions about the validity of the
amendment process. In an early case, the Court refused to
invalidate the Eleventh Amendment on grounds that its
adoption in Congress had failed to conform to the Present-
ment Clause,137 which requires the president to either sign
or veto a bill that has met the bicameralism requirements.1 38
The Court later deferred to Congress on the question wheth-
er Congress alone can select the method of ratification for an
amendment that has been proposed to the states,' 39 and also
on the question whether an amendment has been ratified
with sufficient contemporaneity to its initial proposal.1 40
The Court has at least twice rejected major substantive
challenges to the constitutionality of an Article V amend-
ment. One involved the Eighteenth Amendment, before it
was later repealed by a subsequent Article V amendment.141
Challengers argued that the amendment, which imposed
prohibition, violated federalism, personal liberty, and indi-
vidual freedoms, but the Court disagreed, holding that
amendment "[b]y lawful proposal and ratification, has be-
come part of the Constitution, and must be respected and
given effect the same as other provisions of that instru-
ment."1 42 The other major challenge sought to invalidate the
Nineteenth Amendment, which granted the right to vote to
137. Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. 378 (1798). One scholar disputes the tra-
ditional interpretation of Hollingsworth. See Seth Barrett Tillman, A Textualist Defense
of Article I, Section 7, Clause 3: Why Hollingsworth v. Virginia was Rightly Decided, and
Why INS v. Chadha was Wrongly Reasoned, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1265 (2005).
138. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 7, cls. 2-3.
139. United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 730 (1931).
140. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 452 (1939) (narrowing the holding in Dil-
lon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 375 (1921)). Note, however, that Coleman was decided by a
plurality, which leaves open the durability of the judgment.
141. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
142. Nat'l Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350, 386 (1920).
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women. 143 Similar arguments arose-the amendment vio-
lates federalism, for example-and the Court again refused
to invalidate an amendment that satisfied the procedures of
Article V:
The argument is that so great an addition to the
electorate, if made without the State's consent, destroys
its autonomy as a political body. This Amendment is in
character and phraseology precisely similar to the Fif-
teenth. For each the same method of adoption was pur-
sued. One cannot be valid and the other invalid.'"
In both instances, then, the Court declined the invitation to
question the validity of a duly passed Article V amendment.
But the Supreme Court has taken a different posture
toward state constitutional amendments. The Court has in-
validated state constitutional amendments-duly proposed
and ratified-for violating the United States Constitution.
For example, the Court has relied on the Equal Protection
Clause to invalidate a constitutional amendment to the Colo-
rado constitution denying protected-class status to persons
based on their sexual orientation.14s The Court has also
struck down a constitutional amendment to the Arkansas
Constitution that set term limits on congressional candidates
for the U.S. House of Representatives.1 46  Lower federal
courts have taken a similar position on state constitutional
amendments, invalidating them when, in the view of the
court, the amendment conflicts with the United States Con-
stitution.1 47 This creates a fascinating disjunction: the Unit-
ed States Constitution has often been the basis for invalidat-
ing a state constitutional amendment but never for
143. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
144. Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130, 136 (1922).
145. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635-36 (1996).
146. U.S. Term Limits, Inc., v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 836-38 (1995).
147. See, e.g., Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1229-30 (10th Cir. 2014) (de-
claring unconstitutional Utah constitutional amendment denying right to marry); Co-
lo. Right to Life Committee, Inc. v. Coffman, 498 F.3d 1137, 1151, 1156 (10th Cir.
2007) (holding Colorado constitutional amendment on campaign finance unconstitu-
tional as applied to corporation); Miller v. Moore, 169 F.3d 1119, 1124 (8th Cir. 1999)
(ruling Nebraska constitutional amendment on term limits unconstitutional); Bishop
v. Holder, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1296 (N.D. Okla. 2014) (finding Oklahoma constitu-
tional amendment on marriage unconstitutional); Awad v. Ziriax, 966 F. Supp. 2d
1198, 1206-07 (W.D. Okla. 2013) (invalidating Oklahoma constitutional amendment
prohibiting courts from considering or using international or Sharia law).
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invalidating an Article V amendment. The Supreme Court
has exercised intrusive oversight over state constitutional
amendments, but it has taken a deferential posture toward
formal amendments accomplished using Article V.
B. Judicial Oversight of Formal Amendment
In contrast to the United States Constitution, many oth-
er democratic constitutions have served as the referent for
invalidating duly passed constitutional amendments. Yaniv
Roznai has documented in great detail that constitutional
and supreme courts around the democratic world have exer-
cised the extraordinary power to strike down a formal
amendment.1 48 As Roznai explains, the doctrine of unconsti-
tutional constitutional amendment now exists in some form
in countries as diverse in origins and political geography as
Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Greece, Italy, Nepal, Peru, Por-
tugal, South Africa, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand and Tur-
key.1 49
Courts have exercised the power to invalidate a consti-
tutional amendment in many different ways. In Colombia,
for example, the Constitutional Court has relied on the "sub-
stitution of the constitution" doctrine to reject amendments
that, in its view, amount to a replacement of the Constitution
itself.150 In Turkey, the Constitutional Court is constitution-
ally authorized to invalidate an amendment on procedural
grounds alone, but it has stretched its mandate to now re-
view amendments on substantive grounds as well.15 In In-
dia, the Supreme Court has rejected constitutional amend-
ments that, in its view, violate the unwritten "basic
structure" of the constitution, despite there being no textual
limits on the amendment power.1 52 In the Czech Republic,
the Constitutional Court has interpreted the constitution as
containing an unwritten substantive core that prohibits
148. Roznai, supra note 136.
149. Id.
150. See Carlos Bernal, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments in the Case
Study of Colombia, 11 INT'LJ. CONST. L. 339, 341 (2013).
151. See Yaniv Roznai & Serkan Yolcu, An Unconstitutional Constitutional
Amendment-The Turkish Perspective: A Comment on the Turkish Constitutional
Court's HeadscarfDecision, 10 INT'L J. CONST. L. 175, 195-202 (2012).
152. See GRANVILLE AUSTIN, WORKING A DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: THE INDIAN
EXPERIENCE 197-202 (1999).
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amendments inconsistent with its fundamental features.153
Even in Canada, the foundations have been laid for the Su-
preme Court to one day follow the emerging global trend
toward adopting the doctrine of unconstitutional constitu-
tional amendment.154
American state constitutions have also been a site for
constitutional litigation arising out of formal constitutional
amendment.15 5 Writing in 1910, Walter Dodd observed that
state courts enforced restrictions on constitutional amend-
ment only as to process but not content,1 56 but we have since
seen state courts come to play a prominent role in oversee-
ing a larger universe of the processes of constitutional
change, be they related to the distinction between amend-
ment and revision, the procedural correctness of amend-
ment or initiatives, or the nature of the majorities required
for ratification. 5 7 For example, the Montana Supreme Court
declared an initiative amendment unconstitutional for pro-
cedural defects leading up to the vote.158 The Supreme Court
of Missouri has invalidated a constitutional amendment for
violating the legislative power.15 9 The Iowa Supreme Court
rejected an amendment for not complying with the reporting
requirements in the legislative record.1 60 As a final example,
the Louisiana Supreme Court held unconstitutional an
amendment for failing to satisfy the process of amend-
ment.161
V. CONCLUSION
America's unique Constitution has attracted many ad-
mirers. Its text and interpretation served as a model for
153. See Kieran Williams, When a Constitutional Amendment Violates the 'Sub-
stantive Core': The Czech Constitutional Court's September 2009 Early Elections Deci-
sion, 36 REV. CENT. & E. EUR. L. 33, 42 (2011).
154. See Richard Albert, The Theory and Doctrine of Unconstitutional Constitu-
tionalAmendment in Canada, 41 QUEEN'S L.J. 153 (2015).
155. G. Alan Tarr, Understanding State Constitutions, 65 TEMPLE L. REV. 1169,
1179 (1992).
156. See DODD, supra note 116, at 236.
157. See G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 27-28 (1998).
158. Mont. Citizens for the Preservation of Citizens' Rights v. Waltermire, 738
P.2d 1255, 1264 (Mont. 1987).
159. Power v. Robertson, 93 So. 769, 775-77 (Miss. 1922).
160. Koehler v. Hill, 15 N.W. 609, 629-31 (Iowa 1883).
161. Graham v. Jones, 3 So. 2d 761, 784 (La. 1941).
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constitutional designers around the world, from Africa1 62 to
Asial 63 and Australia,1 64 and from Europe 65 to the Ameri-
cas. 1 6 6 It has also inspired the drafters of modern multilat-
eral agreements and helped shape the law of international
human rights.1 67 But although the United States Constitution
has travelled far from home, it has seldom taken root abroad
as a perfect transplant. Heinz Klug explains the reason why:
While many features of the American model have
been adopted elsewhere, it has been only in very rare
circumstances, such as the Philippines in 1935, where
the adopters have not fundamentally transformed the
model to suit their own particular circumstances or to
162. See, e.g., ADEKEYE ADEBAJO, LIBERIA'S CIVIL WAR: NIGERIA, ECOMOG, AND
REGIONAL SECURITY IN WEST AFRICA 33 (2002); PETER DUIGNAN & L.H. GANN, THE UNITED
STATES AND AFRICA: A HISTORY 201 (1987); JEREMY 1. LEViTT, ILLEGAL PEACE IN AFRICA: AN
INQUIRY INTO THE LEGALITY OF POWER SHARING WITH WARLORDS, REBELS, AND JUNTA 99
(2012).
163. See, e.g., Carmencita T. Aguilar, U.S. Constitutional Principles and the Devel-
opment of Philippine Constitutionalism, in THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION: ITS BIRTH,
GROWTH, AND INFLUENCE IN ASIA 247, 248 (. Barton Starr ed., 1988); M.K.U. Molla, The
Influence of the U.S. Constitution on the Indian Sub-Continent: Pakistan, India and Bang-
ladesh, in THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION: ITS BIRTH, GROWTH, AND INFLUENCE IN ASIA,
supra, at 153, 166; Pamela Sodhy, The American Constitution: Its Impact on Malaysia,
in THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION: ITS BIRTH, GROWTH, AND INFLUENCE IN ASIA, supra, at
169, 169.
164. See, e.g., Nicholas Aroney, Federal Representation and the Framers of the
Australian Constitution, in CONSTITUTIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVES 13, 45
(Gabriel A. Moens ed., 2000); Paul von Nessen, Is There Anything to Fear in Transna-
tionalist Development of Law? The Australian Experience, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 883, 896
(2006).
165. See, e.g., Albert P. Blaustein, The Influence of the United States Constitution
Abroad, 12 OKLA. CITY L. REV. 435, 442-45 (1987); Anthony Lester, The Overseas Trade
in the American Bill of Rights, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 537, 537 (1988).
166. See, e.g., Eduardo Alemdn & George Tsebelis, The Origins of Presidential
Conditional Agenda-Setting Power in Latin America, 40 LATIN AM. RES. REV. 3, 16-17
(2005); Robert S. Barker, Constitutionalism in the Americas: A Bicentennial Perspective,
49 U. PITT. L. REV. 891, 899-900 (1988); Joedd Price, Images and Influences: The Legacy
of the Founding Fathers and the Federal System in Ecuador, 10 LATIN AM. RES. REV. 121,
128-31 (1975); Note, Forty-Ninth Parallel Constitutionalism: How Canadians Invoke
American Constitutional Traditions, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1936, 1938-42 (2007).
167. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Worldwide Influence of the United States Consti-
tution as a Charter of Human Rights, 15 NOVA L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1991); Louis Henkin,
Rights: American and Human, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 405, 415 (1979); Richard B. Lillich, The
Constitution and International Human Rights, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 851, 852 (1989); see
also CONSTITUTIONALISM AND RIGHTS: THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
ABROAD (Louis Henkin & Albert J. Rosenthal eds., 1990) (compiling essays on the in-
fluence of the U.S. Constitution).
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reflect their perceptions of the inadequacy of the origi-
nal form.168
Admiration, then, does not always entail imitation.
But today the United States Constitution may have few-
er admirers and even fewer imitators. In a recent interview
on Al-Ayat television in Egypt, United States Supreme Court
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg stirred some controversy in
America when she declared, "I would not look to the U.S.
Constitution if I were drafting a constitution in the year
2012."169 The influence abroad of the United States Consti-
tution has declined dramatically since its bicentennial, 17 0
part of the reason why we can no longer imagine a British
Prime Minister describing the United States Constitution as
"the most wonderful work ever struck off at a given time by
the brain and purpose of man." 171 New and emerging de-
mocracies now turn more frequently to the semi-
presidential model of constitutional government than the
American model of presidentialism, according to Cindy
Skach. 172 Even Bruce Ackerman, whom we know to be the
best expositor of American constitutional exceptionalism,' 73
has counseled constitutional democracies against adopting
American presidential constitutionalism.1 7 4 America's sof-
tening constitutionalism may be attributable to what James
Allan and Grant Huscroft see as the widening gulf separating
the United States from the world: "the very basics of Ameri-
can constitutionalism," they write, "are not shared interna-
tionally, and sometimes differ greatly."175
168. Heinz Klug, Model and Anti-Model: The United States Constitution and the
"Rise of World Constitutionalism", 2000 Wis. L. REv. 597,604 (2000).
169. Adam Liptak, 'We the People' Loses Appeal with People Around the World,
N.Y. TIMEs (Feb. 6, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/07/us/we-the-people-
loses-appeal-with-people-around-the-world.html [https://perma.cc/9N6-G8CG].
170. David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Declining Influence of the United States
Constitution, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 762, 853 (2012).
171. William E. Gladstone, Kin Beyond Sea, 127 N. AM. REV. 179, 185 (1878).
172. Cindy Skach, The "Newest" Separation of Powers: Semipresidentialism, 5
INT'L J. CONST. L. 93, 93-94 (2007).
173. See James E. Fleming, We the Exceptional American People, 11 CONST.
COMMENT. 355,355 (1994).
174. Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARv. L. REv. 633, 640
(2000).
175. James Allan & Grant Huscroft, Constitutional Rights Coming Home to Roost?
Rights Internationalism in American Courts, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 58 (2006).
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Now a constitutional outlier and perhaps no longer a
constitutional hegemon, the United States Constitution is al-
so exceptional in the context of constitutional amendment.
On three fronts, the Constitution departs from other demo-
cratic constitutions: it is more difficult to formally amend
than virtually all others; it does not entrench any current
form of either first-order or second-order formal unamend-
ability; and it has so far resisted the global trend toward the
doctrine of unconstitutional constitutional amendment.
What makes these divergences all the more notable is that
they distinguish the United States Constitution not only from
other democratic constitutions, but also from state constitu-
tions in the United States. There is therefore something
unique both about the United States Constitution itself and
about America as a federal state whose subnational constitu-
tions more closely resemble the larger world.
It is one thing to identify these markers of difference
but another to understand them. It will take much more
thought than is possible in these pages to make sense of the-
se differences, both as to why state constitutions are less like
the United States Constitution and more like other demo-
cratic constitutions, and also as to why the United States
Constitution seems on this account to stand alone in the
democratic world. But there may be one thread that runs
through the reasons why the United States Constitution is
more difficult to amend than others, why today it makes
nothing formally unamendable, and also why federal courts
do not recognize the doctrine of unconstitutional constitu-
tional amendment: the Constitution is rooted in procedural-
ist values.
The Constitution creates a democracy oriented toward
process, not content, and reflects the ultimate procedural
value of outcome neutrality.1 76 What defines legitimacy is
not what the people chooses but whether and how the people
manifests its will. 177 This constitutional culture of self-
government recognizes that the Constitution derives its le-
176. Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside
Article V, 55 U CHI. L. REV 1043, 1044 n.1 (1988).
177. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 315 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)
(defending the proposition that "ultimate authority, wherever the derivative may be
found, resides in the people alone").
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gitimacy from popular consent: the Constitution will sanc-
tion any end sanctioned by agreement as long as political ac-
tors satisfy the rigid rules of Article V. There is one neces-
sary exception to this proceduralist account: constitutional
change is possible even where political actors and the people
do not abide by the rigid rules of Article V, as long as the will
of the people is clear. This consent-based foundation of the
United States Constitution reconciles why federal courts
have in the past acquiesced to popularly sanctioned trans-
formations achieved outside the formal requirements of Ar-
ticle V, for instance, the post-founding constitutional mo-
ments theorized by Bruce Ackerman.178 On this theory,
federal courts should also recognize the validity of a non-
Article V amendment made by a majoritarian referendum, an
unconventional change Akhil Amar suggests is constitution-
al.1 79
The basic organizing logic that kindles the courtship be-
tween the constitutional text and constitutional politics is
therefore rooted in the constitutional tradition of popular
choice. In this light, formal unamendability and the doctrine
of unconstitutional constitutional amendment pose deep
tensions and indeed reflect values incommensurable with
the proceduralist and popular foundations of the United
States Constitution. The extraordinary difficulty of formal
amendment makes formal unamendability and the doctrine
of unconstitutional constitutional amendment unnecessary
safeguards for ensuring democratic outcomes, which is
largely the reason why constitutional democracies have
turned to both devices. Article V will defeat most amend-
ments, and those that manage to make it through each of the
veto gates along the way to entrenchment will have earned
their place in the Constitution on the strength of overwhelm-
ing popular will.
The reason why the Constitution is so hard to amend is
that it makes institutional consolidation so difficult to
achieve. Institutional consolidation refers to the point at
178. See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); 2 BRUCE
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998); 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE
PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2014).
179. Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment
Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457, 457-458 (1994).
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which political actors converge in agreement at the same
time and across the political branches of government to
support a proposal, in this case an amendment, with the
support of the people.180 This is an extraordinary happening
because the Constitution deliberately creates a presumption
against institutional consolidation, not only by requiring su-
permajorities across federalist institutions but by staggering
national and state elections precisely to ensure that the
mood of the moment is carefully weighed against the delib-
erative preferences that form only over a longer time hori-
zon. The American model of constitutional change regards
this institutional consolidation as an unassailably legitimate
expression of popular will. Where political actors and the
people meet the exceedingly high threshold set by Article V,
the logic of institutional consolidation counsels that it is in-
appropriate for the Court to invalidate the resulting amend-
ment. The same would not be true in jurisdictions where in-
stitutional consolidation is relatively easy to achieve, for
instance India, where the formal amendment rule presents
few barriers to constitutional amendment.181 This is the jus-
tification for reading the basic structure doctrine into the In-
dian Constitution.'8 2
George Washington declared in his farewell address
that "[t]he basis of our political systems is the right of the
people to make and to alter their constitutions of govern-
ment,"183 but he cautioned that the Constitution must be "sa-
credly obligatory upon all" until it is altered.1 84 The difficul-
ty of Article V does not undermine constitutional democracy
in the United States. Article V block most efforts at formal
change, and it validates only the few that have broad and
deep support from political actors and the people. But in
this way, amendment difficulty is a guarantor of popular
consent. Article V invites the people to channel their prefer-
ences through political actors, and recognizes that the peo-
ple "are the only legitimate fountain of power."185 Political
180. Albert, supra note 126, at 44-45.
181. INDIA CONST. pt. XX, art. 368.
182. Albert, supra note 126, at 22.
183. See DARREN PATRICK GUERRA, PERFECTING THE CONSTITUTION: THE CASE FOR THE
ARTICLE V AMENDMENT PROCESS 104-05 (2013).
184. Id
185. THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 339 James Madison) 0acob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
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actors and the people may therefore use Article V to change
the Constitution however they wish. But until they agree to
the change consistent with the extraordinary supermajori-
ties Article V requires, the Constitution's rigidity fosters sta-
bility.
As one of the most rigid constitutions in the democratic
world, the United States Constitution needs no interpretative
supplement like the "basic structure" doctrine to authorize
courts to evaluate the constitutionality of a duly-passed for-
mal amendment. To deny the people their power of consti-
tutional amendment-by designating ex ante a constitution-
al provision forever unamendable or by holding unconstitu-
unconstitutional ex post a constitutional amendment that
has successfully navigated the labyrinthine procedures of
Article V-is inconsistent with the architecture of constitu-
tional law and politics under the United States Constitution.
What nonetheless remains unanswered in this account is a
fundamental question: can the people through their repre-
sentatives exercise their popular will consistent with the
proceduralist values of the United States Constitution to
adopt an Article V amendment that makes the entire Consti-
tution formally unamendable? The answer is yes, but I leave
the how and why to another day.
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